- 2 days ago
How does an oil superpower run out of fuel? Russia is finding out the hard way.
👉 What World Leaders NEED to Know about Russia: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL6d9EIByxz1AdkmIOYUlrDd0rmByq5zSN
In this episode, Elvira Bary explains how one of the world’s biggest oil exporters ended up facing gasoline lines, diesel shortages, empty pumps, scarce fuel canisters, and growing pressure on farmers, drivers, businesses, and the army. Russia has oil in the ground, but oil is not gasoline in the tank. Between the Siberian well and the Russian driver lies a fragile chain of refineries, pipelines, railways, depots, trucks, spare parts, software, subsidies, and political decisions. Ukraine is striking the weak points in that chain, sanctions are making repairs slower, and regional shortages are turning Russia’s fuel machine into a national stress test.
Video Chapters:
00:00 How an Oil Superpower Ran Out of Fuel
05:32 The Oil Inheritance
09:40 Russia’s Fuel Machine
14:39 Ukraine’s Refinery War
16:50 The Repair Trap
18:55 The Regional Squeeze
21:18 The Army Problem
21:11 The Six-Month Window
JOIN ME ON THE JOURNEY
👉 Sign-up for news about the New Book here: https://elvirabary
👉 What World Leaders NEED to Know about Russia: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL6d9EIByxz1AdkmIOYUlrDd0rmByq5zSN
In this episode, Elvira Bary explains how one of the world’s biggest oil exporters ended up facing gasoline lines, diesel shortages, empty pumps, scarce fuel canisters, and growing pressure on farmers, drivers, businesses, and the army. Russia has oil in the ground, but oil is not gasoline in the tank. Between the Siberian well and the Russian driver lies a fragile chain of refineries, pipelines, railways, depots, trucks, spare parts, software, subsidies, and political decisions. Ukraine is striking the weak points in that chain, sanctions are making repairs slower, and regional shortages are turning Russia’s fuel machine into a national stress test.
Video Chapters:
00:00 How an Oil Superpower Ran Out of Fuel
05:32 The Oil Inheritance
09:40 Russia’s Fuel Machine
14:39 Ukraine’s Refinery War
16:50 The Repair Trap
18:55 The Regional Squeeze
21:18 The Army Problem
21:11 The Six-Month Window
JOIN ME ON THE JOURNEY
👉 Sign-up for news about the New Book here: https://elvirabary
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LearningTranscript
00:00Russia is one of the world's biggest oil exporters.
00:04And yet, in parts of Russia, people are standing in line for gasoline.
00:09Farmers worry whether they'll have enough diesel to bring in the next harvest.
00:15Drivers arrive at gas stations with canisters, trying to buy fuel before the pumps run dry tomorrow.
00:21Even the canisters themselves are becoming harder to find because everyone suddenly wants one.
00:30So, here's the question.
00:32How does an oil superpower run short on fuel?
00:37The answer is simple on the surface and brutal underneath.
00:42Oil in the ground is not gasoline in the tank.
00:46Between the Siberian well and the Russian driver,
00:50between the refinery and the Russian army,
00:53there is a long chain of pipelines, refineries, railways, depots,
00:59trucks, spare parts, software, subsidies, and political decisions.
01:05Ukraine has learned where that chain is weakest.
01:09And sanctions have made it much harder for Russia to repair what breaks.
01:15I'm Elvira Barry, a writer born in the Soviet Union.
01:18And today, we will look at what caused Russia's fuel crisis,
01:23how the country is trying to manage it, and what may happen if this continues.
01:29Here's our roadmap.
01:31The oil inheritance.
01:33How Russia became rich on oil and why that wealth always depended on more than oil itself.
01:41Russia's fuel machine.
01:43Who refines, distributes, sells, and transports fuel across the country.
01:48Ukraine's refinery war.
01:51Why Ukraine is targeting refineries, depots, and fuel logistics.
01:56The repair trap.
01:58Why Russia cannot quickly restore everything under sanctions.
02:02The regional seizure.
02:04Why some regions suffer faster and harder than others.
02:09The army problem.
02:10How fuel disruption reaches the front.
02:13The six-month window.
02:15So, what happens if this pressure keeps building?
02:20If you'd like to keep getting this kind of insight,
02:24please subscribe, like, share, join my think tank,
02:27support through PayPal or SuperThings, or tap Hype Points.
02:31That is how this channel stays independent and keeps doing deeper analysis.
02:37And if you are listening on Spotify, follow the show
02:40so the next episode lands in your feed automatically.
02:43Before we go any further, I want to ask for your help.
02:49Here is the situation.
02:51I wrote a novel about drone warfare in Ukraine
02:54and about how the Russian elites actually operate.
02:58This book is the result of an enormous number of interviews
03:02with very different people,
03:04from soldiers in the Ukrainian army to top managers in Moscow.
03:08Naturally, I couldn't publish such a book through Russian publishing houses.
03:11What is happening there now is a genuine cultural pogrom.
03:16People are being persecuted not even for political thrillers,
03:20but for harmless summer novels about gay love.
03:24So, I published the Snow Queen Spring in Russian on my website.
03:29Two weeks later, the Russian Ministry of Justice
03:32officially declared me a foreign agent.
03:36In other words, an enemy of the Putin state.
03:40That should give you some idea of how quickly they reacted.
03:45Now, the book is spreading like wildfire by word of mouth.
03:50I can see it in my website statistics.
03:53At any given moment, hundreds of people are there reading it.
03:57And I am receiving a huge number of grateful messages from Ukrainians.
04:02The novel has already been translated into English
04:05and now I need to find publishers in the United States and Europe.
04:11I need this because I want to provoke Putin's officials even more.
04:16If the book is published by a prestigious Western house,
04:20they will panic, denounce it loudly, and begin attacking it.
04:26That, in turn, will arouse curiosity
04:29and I will have a chance to talk about my understanding of the war in Ukraine
04:34and about responsibility, guilt, and a possible way out.
04:38I cannot break into the publishing world from the street.
04:42No one replies to me.
04:43I understand why.
04:45My geopublishers receive hundreds of submissions a day.
04:49And I cannot ask my former Russian publishers for help either.
04:54For them, any contact with me is unsafe.
04:59So, if you have connections to respected publishing houses,
05:04editors, or literally agents who work with geopolitical thrillers,
05:08please put me in touch with them.
05:10You can read the opening of the book on my website alveribari.com
05:15to judge the quality for yourself.
05:17Putinism will not bring itself down.
05:20Something has to change in people's minds.
05:24And that is exactly what books and films are for.
05:28Now, let us return to our video.
05:32The Oil Inheritance
05:36Long before the Soviet Union existed,
05:38the Russian Empire was already developing oil fields in the Caucasus,
05:43especially around Baku on the Caspian Sea.
05:46At first, oil was not about cars.
05:50It was used for kerosene lamps, machine lubricants, industry, and shipping.
05:55Russia had oil in the ground,
05:57but it lacked much of the capital, technology, transport infrastructure,
06:02and industrial expertise needed to turn that oil into a global business.
06:07So, from the beginning, Russian oil power had a contradiction inside it.
06:11The resource was domestic,
06:13but the technology and know-how came from outside.
06:18After the Bolshevik Revolution,
06:19the oil industry was nationalized and folded into the Soviet planned economy.
06:25During World War II,
06:26the Soviet Union relied heavily on domestic oil,
06:30especially from the Caucasus and Baku.
06:32But it still depended on allies for crucial supplies.
06:37Land lease provided aviation fuel,
06:40trucks, locomotives,
06:42railway cars,
06:44industrial equipment,
06:45and other materials that helped the Soviet system move,
06:49fight, and recover.
06:50So, again, we see the same pattern.
06:54Russia had raw resources,
06:56but under extreme pressure,
06:58it needed outside technology, machinery, and logistics support.
07:03After the war,
07:04the discovery and development of Western Siberian oil and gas changed Soviet history.
07:10Europe needed cheap energy.
07:13The Soviet Union supplied it.
07:15Hydrocarbon exports brought in hard currency, machinery, grain, and technology.
07:21In simple terms,
07:23oil allowed the Soviet Union to keep pretending
07:26that its economic model worked better than it did.
07:30When oil prices were high,
07:32the Soviet leadership could subsidize allies,
07:36maintain a giant military machine,
07:38and compete with the United States.
07:41But when oil prices collapsed in the 1980s,
07:46every weakness became harder to hide.
07:49Oil did not destroy the Soviet Union by itself,
07:52but falling revenues made all existing problems worse.
07:57Then, the Soviet Union collapsed.
08:00In the 1990s,
08:02Russia was chaotic and poor.
08:04But by the early 2000s,
08:06global oil prices rose sharply.
08:08This was the great gift that helped build Putin's system.
08:12Russia became rich not because it created a diversified economy,
08:16but because oil and gas money flooded in.
08:20At the same time,
08:21Russian society changed.
08:23First,
08:24Russians became car owners
08:25and started building their lives around the car.
08:28Second,
08:29the movement of goods changed.
08:32Russia is still a real heavy country,
08:35especially for long-distance industrial freight,
08:37but the everyday economy
08:39has become far more dependent on diesel trucks.
08:42So,
08:43today's Russia is much more vulnerable
08:46to fuel disruption than the Soviet Union was.
08:49A Soviet citizen without a private car
08:51could still take a bus, tram,
08:53trolleybus,
08:54metro,
08:54or commuter train.
08:56A modern Russian family in a server
08:58may not have that option.
09:01A Soviet logistics system
09:03could push more through state rail plans.
09:06A modern mixed economy
09:08depends on thousands of trucking routes,
09:11private suppliers,
09:13regional distributors,
09:15and small businesses
09:16that cannot function without fuel.
09:18This is why Russia's fuel crisis
09:20is not only about oil production.
09:23Oil in the ground
09:24is not gasoline in the tank.
09:26Between the Siberian well
09:28and the Russian driver,
09:29between the refinery
09:31and the Russian army,
09:32there is a long and fragile chain.
09:35Now,
09:36let's look at how that machine works.
09:40Russia's fuel machine
09:44Russia produces crude oil
09:46mainly in Western Siberia,
09:48the Volga-Urals region,
09:50Eastern Siberia,
09:51and the Far East.
09:53But crude oil is not fuel yet.
09:56It has to travel through pipelines,
09:58mostly controlled by the state pipeline
10:00monopoly Transneft,
10:01to refineries.
10:02Only there does it become
10:04gasoline,
10:05diesel,
10:06jet fuel,
10:06and other usable products.
10:08Then,
10:09the finished fuel
10:10has to move again
10:11by pipeline,
10:12rail,
10:13river,
10:13sea,
10:13and finally by truck
10:15to depots,
10:16farms,
10:16and gas stations.
10:18Russia's major refineries
10:19are spread across the country,
10:20but many of the most important ones
10:23are in the European part of Russia
10:25and the Volga-Urals industrial belt.
10:28The allegations made sense
10:30for the Soviet and post-Soviet economy
10:32close to pipelines,
10:34railings,
10:35industrial centers,
10:36export routes,
10:37and large consumer markets.
10:40But refineries have one major weakness.
10:42They are huge,
10:44fixed,
10:45complex targets.
10:46You cannot hide a refinery.
10:49You cannot move it.
10:50And if key refining units are damaged,
10:54repairs may require specialized equipment,
10:56imported parts,
10:58software,
10:59engineering expertise,
11:00and months of work.
11:02This brings us to ownership.
11:05The big oil companies
11:07dominate much of the chain.
11:09Rosneft is the largest player,
11:12a major oil producer,
11:14refiner,
11:14and retailer
11:15with thousands of gas stations.
11:18Other major companies
11:19include
11:20Gazprom Neft,
11:21Lukoil,
11:22Tatneft,
11:23Surgut Neftegaz,
11:24and others.
11:25Some look private on paper.
11:27Some are openly state-controlled.
11:30But in Putin's Russia,
11:32that distinction is limited.
11:34The state controls licenses,
11:37export permissions,
11:38taxes,
11:38and regulations.
11:40Nobody in the oil business
11:42is truly independent of the Kremlin.
11:44The state uses the oil sector
11:46as a fiscal machine.
11:48Oil and gas revenues
11:49have long provided
11:51a huge share
11:52of the federal budget.
11:53So fuel is not just
11:54a consumer product.
11:56It is part of the bloodstream
11:58of the state.
11:59The Kremlin wants
12:01everything at once.
12:02It wants companies to export
12:04because experts bring hard currency.
12:07It wants them to supply
12:09the domestic market
12:10because shortages
12:11create public anger.
12:13It wants fuel prices
12:15to stay politically low.
12:16It wants taxes.
12:18It wants war funding.
12:20It wants social stability.
12:22These goals contradict each other.
12:24When world prices are high,
12:26companies prefer experts.
12:28When domestic prices
12:29are held down,
12:31selling fuel
12:32inside Russia
12:32becomes less profitable.
12:34When refineries
12:36are damaged,
12:37supply tightens.
12:38And when wholesale prices
12:40rise faster
12:41than retail prices,
12:43independent gas stations
12:45suffer first.
12:46A large integrated company
12:48can produce crude,
12:50refine it,
12:51transport it,
12:52and sell it
12:53through its own network.
12:54An independent gas station
12:56often buys fuel
12:58on the wholesale market
12:59and resells it locally.
13:01If wholesale prices jump
13:03and retail prices
13:05cannot follow,
13:06that station
13:07may simply stop selling.
13:09This is why
13:10shortages
13:11do not spread evenly.
13:12One region
13:13may look normal.
13:15Another
13:15may introduce limits.
13:18A third
13:18may have fuel
13:19in the morning
13:20and empty pumps
13:21by evening.
13:23Fuel shortages
13:24are not only about
13:25national production.
13:26They are about
13:27location,
13:28logistics,
13:29ownership,
13:30and political control.
13:31The state
13:32can try to manage
13:33this crisis.
13:34It can
13:35restrict experts,
13:37pressure producers,
13:38adjust subsidies,
13:40release reserves,
13:41or force more fuel
13:43onto the domestic market.
13:44But all of these tools
13:45assume that
13:46the physical machine
13:47still works.
13:48And this is
13:49the new problem.
13:51Russia's fuel system
13:52was built
13:53with war in mind,
13:54but for
13:55different kind of war.
13:58Distance used
13:58to protect
13:59strategic industry.
14:01Refineries
14:02far from the border
14:03were considered
14:04safer.
14:06Modern drones
14:07change that.
14:08They do not
14:09need to occupy
14:10territory
14:10or defeat
14:11an army.
14:12They only need
14:13to reach
14:14a refinery,
14:15a fuel depot,
14:16a pumping station,
14:18or a rail junction.
14:20Suddenly,
14:21Russia's size
14:22becomes not only
14:23a strength,
14:23but a burden.
14:25Every refinery,
14:26depot,
14:27pipeline,
14:27hub and loading
14:29station
14:29needs protection.
14:31The Kremlin
14:32cannot cover
14:34everything.
14:35This is the
14:36vulnerability
14:36inside Russia's
14:37fuel machine.
14:39Ukraine's
14:40refinery war
14:43Ukraine is
14:44hitting refineries,
14:46depots,
14:46pumping stations,
14:47ports,
14:48transport routes,
14:49and the power
14:49systems around them.
14:51Refineries matter
14:52a lot
14:53because they are
14:55a backbone
14:56of the system.
14:57Only 13
14:59large refineries
15:00handle roughly
15:01two-thirds
15:02to three-quarters
15:03of Russia's
15:04total capacity.
15:05And they are
15:06complex industrial
15:07systems
15:07that cost a lot
15:09to repair.
15:10The Moscow
15:11refinery
15:12is the
15:12clearest example.
15:14In June
15:142026,
15:15the Moscow
15:16oil refinery
15:17operated by
15:17Gazprom
15:18Neft
15:18was struck
15:19twice by
15:20Ukrainian drones.
15:21The
15:22planned
15:22halted
15:23operations
15:24unlikely to
15:25resume production
15:26this year.
15:26In 2024,
15:28it processed
15:2811.6 million
15:30tons of crude
15:31oil,
15:31the largest
15:32fuel supplier
15:33for the
15:34Moscow region.
15:35That matters
15:36psychologically
15:37too.
15:37For years,
15:38the war was
15:39supposed to
15:40stay far away
15:41from Moscow.
15:41It was supposed
15:42to be
15:43felled by
15:44poor regions,
15:45occupied territories,
15:46border towns,
15:47and families
15:48of mobilized
15:49men.
15:50Then drones
15:51reached a
15:52refinery serving
15:53the capital.
15:54I have a
15:55dedicated video
15:56about why
15:56the shock
15:57of the first
15:58drone attack
15:58on Moscow
15:59was so huge.
16:00Ukraine's
16:01fuel disruption
16:01campaign works
16:02because Russia
16:03cannot protect
16:04everything.
16:05A country
16:05that large
16:06has too many
16:07fixed targets.
16:09Air defense
16:10cannot cover
16:11all of them
16:11perfectly
16:12every night
16:13across
16:13thousands of
16:15miles.
16:15And the
16:16drones
16:16keep
16:17improving.
16:19Earlier
16:19in the
16:20war,
16:20Ukraine
16:20did not
16:21have
16:21this
16:22kind
16:22of
16:22deep
16:22strike
16:23capacity.
16:24It had
16:24to defend
16:25its own
16:26cities,
16:26and many
16:27of the
16:28Western
16:28weapons
16:29it received
16:29came with
16:30political
16:31restrictions.
16:32So Ukraine
16:33built its
16:33own long-range
16:34drone industry.
16:36It studied
16:37Russian air
16:37defense,
16:38mapped
16:39the gaps,
16:40and learned
16:40how to reach
16:41targets that
16:42once seemed
16:43safely beyond
16:44the war zone.
16:45The result
16:46is what we
16:47now see
16:47in the
16:47news
16:48almost every
16:49day.
16:50The repair
16:51trap
16:54A refinery
16:55is easy to
16:56burn and
16:56hard to
16:57rebuild.
16:57This is part
16:58Russian television
16:59tries to
17:00hide.
17:01It can show
17:02a governor
17:02saying,
17:03the fire has
17:03been extinguished
17:04and there's
17:05no threat
17:06to residents.
17:07And sometimes
17:08that is true.
17:09But a fire
17:10being out
17:11does not
17:12mean the
17:13refinery
17:13is back
17:14to work.
17:14A refinery
17:16has too
17:16many moving
17:17parts.
17:17If one
17:18important link
17:19breaks,
17:20the whole
17:20plant loses
17:21capacity.
17:22Russia can
17:23repair some
17:24damage quickly,
17:25but deeper
17:26damage is
17:27different.
17:27If a primary
17:28refining unit
17:30is hit or
17:30if several
17:31units are
17:32damaged together,
17:33repairs can
17:34take months.
17:35By May
17:362026,
17:37about a
17:38quarter of
17:38Russia's
17:39total refining
17:40capacity was
17:40already out
17:41because 16
17:43refineries had
17:44fully or partly
17:45halted operations.
17:46Their share
17:47of fuel output
17:49was even
17:49more painful,
17:50over 30%
17:52for gasoline
17:53and about
17:54a quarter
17:54for diesel.
17:55That is why
17:56repeated strikes
17:57matter.
17:57They create a
17:58shortage of
17:59repair teams
18:00and spare parts
18:01as too many
18:02sides start
18:03to need them.
18:04Sanctions
18:05make this
18:05worse.
18:06For years,
18:07Russian refineries
18:08were modernized
18:09with foreign
18:10technology,
18:11foreign equipment
18:12and foreign
18:13service support.
18:14When sophisticated
18:15equipment breaks,
18:17restoring it
18:17requires exact
18:19replacements.
18:20Under sanctions,
18:21that means
18:22delays,
18:23smuggling routes,
18:25lower standards
18:26and ugly
18:27improvised
18:27substitutions.
18:29And there is
18:30another trap.
18:32If refineries
18:33are damaged,
18:34Russia may
18:35export more
18:36crude instead
18:37of refined
18:38products.
18:39But refined
18:40products are
18:40what the
18:41domestic economy
18:42needs.
18:43The more crude
18:44goes abroad,
18:45the less of it
18:46is left to
18:47become the fuel
18:48that fills a
18:49tractor in
18:50Irkutsk,
18:50a bus in
18:52Crimea,
18:52or a truck
18:53going toward
18:54the front.
18:55The regional
18:56squeeze.
18:59A fuel
19:00crisis in
19:01Russia affects
19:01some regions
19:02more than
19:03others.
19:03The first
19:04obvious weak
19:05point is
19:06Crimea.
19:07It is
19:07militarized
19:08and exposed.
19:10It depends
19:11on vulnerable
19:12routes and
19:12supplies from
19:13Russia and
19:14occupied
19:14sovereign
19:15Ukraine.
19:16In June
19:172026,
19:18Russian-controlled
19:19Crimea
19:19tightened
19:20fuel
19:20rationing.
19:21Cash sales
19:22of gasoline
19:23were suspended
19:24and new
19:24coupons
19:25stopped being
19:26issued.
19:27Drivers stood
19:27in lines
19:28after Ukrainian
19:29strikes
19:29restricted
19:30supplies.
19:31Then there
19:32are border
19:33and sovereign
19:34regions.
19:34Rostov,
19:36Belgaard,
19:36Kursk,
19:37Voronish,
19:38Krasnodar,
19:38occupied
19:39Donetsk and
19:39Lugatsk.
19:40These are
19:41rare areas
19:42for the war.
19:44A shortage
19:45there affects
19:46both civilian
19:47life and
19:47military supply.
19:49Moscow is a
19:50separate shock.
19:51When the
19:51Moscow refinery
19:52was hit,
19:53the problem
19:53moved from
19:54the edge
19:54to the center.
19:56Tatarstan
19:56gives another
19:57kind of
19:58warning.
19:59Tadnefti,
20:00one of
20:00Russia's
20:01important
20:02oil
20:02producers,
20:03imposed
20:03fuel
20:04sale
20:04restrictions
20:05at its
20:05filling
20:06stations.
20:07That is
20:07striking
20:08because
20:09Tatarstan
20:10is an
20:11oil
20:11region.
20:12Then there
20:12is Siberia.
20:13Reports
20:14from June
20:142026
20:15said fuel
20:15shortages
20:16had been
20:16officially
20:17confirmed
20:17in many
20:18Siberian
20:18regions.
20:19Siberia
20:19is where
20:20Russia's
20:20distance
20:21problem
20:21becomes
20:22brutal.
20:23If fuel
20:24is pulled
20:24away
20:24towards
20:25central
20:25Russia,
20:26the
20:26local
20:26consequences
20:27can be
20:28sharp.
20:29The
20:29Far
20:29East
20:30has
20:30the
20:30same
20:30problem
20:31in
20:31another
20:31form.
20:32It is
20:33far
20:33from
20:34the
20:34center,
20:34hard
20:35to
20:35supply,
20:35and
20:36often
20:36expensive
20:37even
20:37in
20:38normal
20:38times.
20:39If
20:39Moscow
20:40begins
20:40pulling
20:41supply
20:41toward
20:42politically
20:42sensitive
20:43regions,
20:44remote
20:45territories
20:45fill
20:46the
20:46shortage
20:47faster.
20:48Some
20:48people
20:49believe
20:49the
20:49Caucasus
20:50to be
20:50the
20:51last
20:51place
20:52that
20:52fills
20:52fuel
20:53shortages
20:53for
20:54that
20:54very
20:55reason
20:55of
20:55political
20:56sensitivity.
20:56And
20:57still
20:58Mahajkala
20:59recently
20:59imposed
21:00sale
21:01limits.
21:01This
21:02is another
21:02proof that
21:03shortages
21:03can change
21:04quickly.
21:04One person
21:05posts that
21:06everything
21:06is normal,
21:07but two
21:07days later
21:08the same
21:09city
21:09has
21:10lines
21:11at
21:11gas
21:11stations.
21:12Those
21:13that don't
21:14yet have
21:14a handwritten
21:15sign saying
21:16no gas.
21:17The
21:18army
21:18problem
21:22The
21:22Russian
21:23army
21:23runs
21:23on
21:24trucks
21:24that
21:25transport
21:25food,
21:26ammunition
21:26and
21:27other
21:27supplies.
21:28There
21:28are
21:29also
21:29evacuation
21:30vehicles,
21:31generators,
21:32construction
21:32machines
21:33and
21:33mobile
21:34workshops,
21:35all of
21:36them
21:36using
21:36gasoline
21:37or
21:37diesel.
21:38The
21:38Kremlin
21:39will
21:39always
21:39try
21:39to
21:39protect
21:40the
21:40military
21:41first.
21:41Fuel
21:42for
21:42the
21:42front
21:42will
21:43have
21:43priority
21:43over
21:44fuel
21:44for
21:44private
21:45drivers.
21:45But
21:46that
21:47does
21:47not
21:47remove
21:47the
21:48shortage.
21:48Instead,
21:49it pushes
21:50the
21:50shortage
21:51somewhere
21:51else and
21:52the
21:52consequences
21:53will
21:53be
21:53eventually
21:54felt
21:55by
21:55the
21:55military
21:56as
21:56well.
21:57A
21:57farmer
21:57gets
21:58less
21:58diesel
21:59and
21:59must
21:59leave
22:00crops
22:00unharvested.
22:01A
22:02truck
22:02company
22:02delays
22:03deliveries.
22:04Prices
22:04rise.
22:05People
22:06grab
22:06as
22:06much
22:07fuel
22:07as
22:07they
22:07can
22:08and
22:08store
22:08it
22:08in
22:09garages
22:09and
22:10balconies
22:11because
22:11they
22:12no longer
22:12believe
22:12official
22:13statements.
22:14This
22:14panic
22:14drives
22:15city
22:15gas
22:15stations
22:16even
22:16faster.
22:16The
22:17civilian
22:17economy
22:18slows
22:18down.
22:19The
22:19state
22:19budget
22:20receives
22:20less
22:20money
22:21it
22:21can
22:22spend
22:22on
22:22war.
22:23There
22:23is
22:24another
22:24detail
22:24that
22:25matters.
22:26In
22:26this
22:27war,
22:27the
22:27line
22:28between
22:28military
22:28and
22:29civilian
22:29transport
22:30is
22:30often
22:30blurred.
22:31Russian
22:32units
22:32use
22:33civilian
22:33looking
22:33trucks.
22:34Volunteers
22:35and
22:35contractors
22:36move
22:36supplies
22:37on
22:37civilian
22:38vehicles.
22:39Fuel
22:40may
22:40go
22:40through
22:41civilian
22:41infrastructure
22:42before
22:42it
22:42reaches
22:43the
22:43military
22:43system.
22:44That
22:45means
22:45pressure
22:46on regular
22:46fuel
22:47networks
22:47can
22:48directly
22:48affect
22:49the
22:49war.
22:50That
22:50doesn't
22:51mean
22:51a
22:51fuel
22:52crisis
22:52will
22:53make
22:53the
22:53Russian
22:53army
22:54stop
22:54tomorrow
22:54morning.
22:55Russia
22:56is a
22:56huge
22:57state
22:57with
22:57reserves,
22:58coercion
22:59and
22:59the
22:59ability
23:00to
23:00take
23:00fuel
23:01from
23:01one
23:01place
23:02and
23:02send
23:02it
23:02to
23:02another.
23:03But
23:04the
23:04cost
23:04of
23:05every
23:05movement
23:06rises.
23:07And
23:07in
23:08a
23:08long
23:08war
23:08that
23:09cost
23:10will
23:10pile up.
23:16Ukraine's
23:16opportunity
23:17comes
23:17from
23:17one
23:18fact
23:18refineries
23:19are
23:19fixed
23:19targets.
23:20If
23:20Ukraine
23:21can
23:21keep
23:21striking
23:22refineries
23:22to
23:22post
23:23ports,
23:23power
23:23stations
23:24and
23:24transport
23:25nodes
23:25for
23:25several
23:26more
23:26months,
23:27Russia's
23:27problem
23:28becomes
23:28cumulative.
23:29There
23:30will be
23:30too
23:30much
23:31stress
23:31for
23:32the
23:32system
23:32to
23:32absorb.
23:33Instead
23:34of
23:34solving
23:35a
23:35shortage,
23:36it
23:36will be
23:36choosing
23:37who
23:37suffers
23:38it
23:38first
23:38and
23:39who
23:39a
23:39bit
23:40later.
23:40The
23:41tools
23:41are
23:41already
23:42visible.
23:43Russia
23:43is
23:44restricting
23:45exports
23:45and
23:46lowering
23:46fuel
23:46quality
23:47standards.
23:48It
23:48is
23:48importing
23:49gasoline
23:49from
23:50Belarus
23:50and
23:51considers
23:51buying
23:52more
23:52from
23:52Kazakhstan
23:53or
23:53India.
23:54It
23:54can
23:54also
23:55move
23:55fuel
23:55from
23:56Siberia
23:56or
23:56the
23:57Far
23:57East
23:57toward
23:58politically
23:58sensitive
23:59regions.
24:00But
24:00every
24:01tool
24:01has
24:02a
24:02limit.
24:03Belarus
24:03and
24:04Kazakhstan
24:04have
24:05their
24:05own
24:05markets
24:06and
24:06obligations.
24:07Seaborn
24:08imports
24:08are
24:09expensive
24:09and
24:10awkward
24:10for
24:11a
24:11country
24:11that
24:11is
24:11supposed
24:12to
24:12be
24:12an
24:13oil
24:13superpower.
24:15Expert
24:15bans
24:15protect
24:16domestic
24:17supply
24:17but
24:18cut
24:18into
24:18revenue
24:19and
24:19annoy
24:20companies.
24:21Pulling
24:22fuel
24:22from
24:23distant
24:23regions
24:24helps
24:24one
24:25place
24:25and
24:26hurts
24:26another.
24:27This
24:27is
24:27why
24:28the
24:28phrase
24:28Russia
24:29will
24:29just
24:29buy
24:29fuel
24:30abroad
24:30sounds
24:31much
24:31easier
24:32than
24:32it
24:32is.
24:33Buy
24:33from
24:33whom?
24:34How
24:35much?
24:35At
24:36what
24:36price?
24:37How
24:37will
24:38it
24:38be
24:38delivered?
24:39And
24:39will
24:40it
24:40arrive
24:40where
24:41the
24:41shortage
24:42actually
24:42is?
24:43Some
24:43Ukrainian
24:44experts
24:44believe that
24:45the next
24:45six months
24:46of sustained
24:46attacks on
24:47Russia's
24:48fuel machine
24:48can break
24:49it down
24:49completely.
24:50That
24:51pressure
24:51can push
24:52Russia toward
24:52freezing the
24:53front line
24:54and bring
24:54the long
24:55awaited
24:55peace
24:56closer.
24:56However,
24:58even the
24:58end of
24:59war will
24:59not resolve
25:00Russia's
25:00deeper
25:01problems.
25:01sanctions
25:03will
25:03not
25:03disappear
25:04quickly
25:04and
25:05damaged
25:06refineries
25:06will
25:07not
25:07repair
25:07themselves.
25:09Before
25:09you go,
25:10I want
25:11to ask
25:11you something
25:11personal.
25:13If you
25:13ran out
25:14in your
25:14region,
25:15what would
25:16you do
25:16and how
25:17would it
25:18affect
25:18your life?
25:19Please
25:20share your
25:21answer in
25:21the comments.
25:22If this
25:23video helped
25:24you understand
25:24how an
25:25oil superpower
25:26can run
25:27short on
25:27fuel,
25:28please like,
25:29subscribe and
25:30share it with
25:30one person
25:31who still
25:32thinks Russia
25:32can absorb
25:33every strike
25:34without serious
25:35consequences.
25:36And if you
25:37want to support
25:38this channel
25:38directly,
25:39you can join
25:39my think tank,
25:40leave us
25:41super thanks,
25:42support through
25:42PayPal or
25:43tap
25:44Hype Points
25:45to help
25:45this episode
25:46travel further.
25:47For those
25:48listening on
25:49Spotify,
25:49follow the
25:50show so you
25:51don't miss
25:51the next one.
25:53Thank you
25:53for watching.
25:54See you
25:54next time.
26:00...
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