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For educational purposes
This is the story of the rise and fall of one of the legendary forces of warfare "The Afrika Korps"
During its brief existence, the Afrika Korps forced the Allied forces ranged against it into a for war of attrition, thereby cementing its place in the annals of military history.
The Afrika Korps will be forever associated with its brilliant commander Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox of legend, whose masterfully-executed battle plans gained the respect of even his enemies.
This programme combines superb footage from the German and Allied archives with comment and analysis by some of the UK's leading military authorities to tell the story of a proud force which finally met its match at the Mareth Line in Tunisia in March 1943.
This is the story of the rise and fall of one of the legendary forces of warfare "The Afrika Korps"
During its brief existence, the Afrika Korps forced the Allied forces ranged against it into a for war of attrition, thereby cementing its place in the annals of military history.
The Afrika Korps will be forever associated with its brilliant commander Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox of legend, whose masterfully-executed battle plans gained the respect of even his enemies.
This programme combines superb footage from the German and Allied archives with comment and analysis by some of the UK's leading military authorities to tell the story of a proud force which finally met its match at the Mareth Line in Tunisia in March 1943.
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LearningTranscript
00:03These are the remains of the Morath Line in Tunisia.
00:07It was here that Field Marshal Erwin Brommel fought his last battle in Africa.
00:14As a powerful British force closed inexorably on the last remnants of the Africa Corps,
00:20the Desert Fox issued his final battle orders from this very position.
00:26When they occupied these parts, in March 1943, the men of the Africa Corps were staring defeat in the face.
00:35Allied armies were closing in from all sides,
00:38and it must have been obvious to the men manning even these well-constructed defences that the end was near.
00:46It was the end of a proud force that has become a legend in warfare, the Africa Corps.
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05:04was made in early January 1941 to actually prevent a British advance.
05:10There was never at any time the idea that this blocking force
05:14might actually become an operational unit
05:18which was going to advance into Egypt
05:20and perhaps try and advance all the way to Cairo.
05:22This simply wasn't on the cards.
05:24The first German unit shipped to Italy was the 5th Light Division,
05:29consisting of a reconnaissance, anti-tank and light artillery battalion.
05:34They were supported by service detachments consisting of a signals and an engineer company.
05:40The unit was later to be re-designated as the 21st Panzer Division,
05:46one of the most famous fighting forces of World War II.
05:51Rommel had been recalled from leave to lead the forces.
05:56They crossed by sea arriving in Tripoli on February 14th, 1941
06:02and were quickly reinforced by the 5th Panzer Regiment,
06:05by the 15th Panzer Division and by the 90th Light Division.
06:12All these units were new formations,
06:15rapidly assembled from fragments of previous divisions.
06:20In addition, there was air support provided by a force of Stuka dive bombers
06:25and Messerschmitt fighters operating from air fiends in Sicily.
06:31The soldiers themselves were a cross-section of the German army,
06:34but mercifully free of the political bigots,
06:37the SS or the Gestapo,
06:39which featured in other German formations.
06:43As a result,
06:44throughout the whole history of the Africa Corps,
06:46they were never tainted by extermination squads
06:49or the ghastly activities of the secret police.
06:52The Africa Corps really carried the early part of the campaign in North Africa.
06:59Between February, March of 1941,
07:02well into early 1942,
07:04wherever the fighting was at its thickest,
07:06there was the Africa Corps.
07:08The Deutsches Africa Corps was, as its name suggests,
07:12only a corps in size.
07:13It was a relatively small force
07:16with two panzer divisions,
07:18and in fact the 2nd Panzer Division didn't arrive until May 1941.
07:22A light division, what was 90th Light Division,
07:25so in other words,
07:26an infantry division without heavy artillery support,
07:29and a couple of reasonable Italian units.
07:33So, in fact, it was not a very substantial force.
07:36The men of the Africa Corps fought hard,
07:39but they believed in and practised the decencies of war.
07:44The Desert War has often been described
07:46as the last example of a chivalrous war.
07:50Nevertheless, it was a hard-fought affair.
07:54By a series of lightning armoured reconnaissance probes,
07:58Rommel quickly established
07:59that the strength of the Allied forces ranged against him
08:02had been overestimated.
08:05He was faced by the 2nd Armoured Division,
08:08newly arrived from Britain,
08:09and not yet acclimatised to desert conditions.
08:14The 2nd Armoured Division
08:16consisted of one weakened armoured brigade,
08:19already short of transport
08:20and with worn-out tanks.
08:23They were supported
08:24by a similarly weakened 9th Australian Division.
08:29A third British formation
08:31was held in reserve, in Tobruk.
08:34These forces were under the command of General Wavell.
08:38Wavell had been siphoning off forces
08:40for Crete and then Greece.
08:42This had been going on since January 1941.
08:46So, when the Africa Corps finally struck in March 1941,
08:50there was a very, very thin screen facing him.
08:53The British, who had swept the Italians back,
08:55were at the end of an enormously long logistical chain.
08:58Essentially, they could not support the number of troops
09:01from Egypt, who were now in the far western desert.
09:06But also, it was well led,
09:08the men were well motivated,
09:09and they had some very good tanks and artillery
09:13to use against the British equipment.
09:16The Germans had trained and developed
09:18the ideas of mobile and manoeuvre warfare
09:21to a fine pitch during the Polish and French campaigns.
09:25This meant that the Africa Corps
09:27was a finely balanced force of all arms,
09:30which was able to traverse almost any terrain
09:33and fight almost any opponent.
09:35As Rommel began his attacks in Serenica,
09:38it became abundantly clear
09:40he possessed an advantage in the quality of his weaponry.
09:44Against the British total of 22 cruiser
09:47and 25 light tanks,
09:49the 5th Panzer Regiment alone fielded 150 tanks,
09:54and nearly half of those
09:55with the superior Mark III and IVs.
09:58In addition, Rommel already possessed
10:01a few 88mm anti-aircraft guns,
10:04which he would use to such devastating effect
10:06as his anti-tank gun.
10:08While the British tended to use their tanks
10:11independently of their other arms,
10:13the Germans developed a very close coordination
10:16between their tanks, anti-tank artillery, and infantry.
10:20This made them a much tougher proposition
10:22in the desert battles.
10:24Vital to Rommel's tactical success
10:26was his continued use of the bait technique,
10:29where his tanks would first tempt the Allied tanks
10:32with a frontal probe.
10:34When the Allied tanks rose to the bait
10:37and charged towards the panzers,
10:39they would fall back behind their screen
10:41of 88mm guns,
10:42which, with their greater range,
10:44could then open up with decisive killing shots
10:48on the advancing armour.
10:50Rommel very quickly realised
10:51that rather than killing tanks with other tanks,
10:54the best way to kill a tank
10:55was with an anti-tank gun.
10:57So what one could do
10:59was simply encourage the British
11:00to attack his infantry,
11:02or indeed his tanks,
11:03and draw them onto a screen
11:04of anti-tank guns.
11:06And this was a technique he used
11:07again and again and again.
11:10And it was something that the British
11:11were never able to effectively counter.
11:15The desert in North Africa
11:17has been described as a tactician's paradise
11:20and a quartermaster's hell.
11:23For a progressive thinker like Rommel,
11:26it was a paradise because of its vast,
11:28uninhabited emptiness,
11:29with no changing seasons,
11:31no partisans,
11:33no resistance groups,
11:34and no urban centres
11:36to slow the movements of armoured divisions.
11:39For the men in charge of logistical support,
11:42it was a pure hell.
11:45Because everything,
11:46fuel, ammunition, food, weapons,
11:48had to pass along
11:49tortuously extended lines of supply,
11:52which became ever more stretched
11:54as the Africa Corps stormed eastwards.
11:57All of the supplies for Rommel's army,
12:01in terms of ammunition,
12:03petrol, and food,
12:05and all the other supplies
12:06that an army needs,
12:07had to be transported from Italy.
12:10The Italian merchant ships
12:12had to run the gauntlet
12:13posed by the British-held island of Malta
12:17with its submarines
12:18and shore-based aircraft.
12:21So although the supply line
12:23was relatively short,
12:25a matter of a mere 60 miles,
12:28it was actually a very vulnerable supply line
12:30to British interdiction.
12:32The supplies then had to be transported over land
12:35on the one road in North Africa,
12:38the Via Balbia built by the Italians.
12:41As Rommel's army advanced eastwards,
12:45so his supply line stretched,
12:47to the extent that in 1942,
12:50once Rommel reaches El Alamein,
12:52only 60 miles away from Alexandria,
12:55his supply line is 1,300 miles long,
13:00from Tripoli to El Alamein.
13:01One of the great problems, of course,
13:03operating over those great distances
13:06is that the trucks themselves use fuel.
13:08Somewhere between 10 and 15 percent
13:10of all the fuel that the Africa Corps needed
13:12was actually spent in sustaining vehicles
13:14on the supply line.
13:15In those sorts of conditions,
13:17over the very rough roads,
13:18and roads which deteriorated quite quickly,
13:20vehicle breakdowns were inevitable.
13:22At any one time, up to about a 30 percent,
13:25perhaps more, around about a third
13:27of Rommel's vehicle fleet,
13:28where it was actually in for repair.
13:30The British helped him enormously.
13:32They seemed to leave their trucks behind,
13:34and indeed, by the summer of 1942,
13:37virtually all of the Africa Corps' transport
13:38were, in fact, British trucks.
13:41Like the Allies before it,
13:43the Africa Corps soon realized
13:45there were geographical limitations
13:47which would force them to operate
13:49within a band stretching
13:50approximately 50 miles south
13:52from the Mediterranean coast.
13:55Further south than that
13:57lay the limitless sand dunes,
13:59with deep desert impassable
14:01to wield or tracked vehicles alike.
14:05Within that 50-mile band
14:06of passable terrain,
14:08there was one road,
14:09the Via Balbia,
14:11which skirted the coast.
14:14Along this tarmac artery
14:16ran Rommel's armoured units
14:17and his columns of supply lorries.
14:21Petrol was one of the most precious commodities.
14:24From the outset,
14:26it was always rationed,
14:27and any unauthorised use of a vehicle
14:30was heavily punished.
14:32The North African terrain
14:34was particularly harsh.
14:36Although one might tend to think
14:38of great swathes of sand dunes,
14:40it's in actual fact a lot of it
14:41was very stony, barren desert.
14:44And this took an enormous toll,
14:45not just on the people there,
14:47but on the vehicles themselves.
14:50Tank tracks would be torn off,
14:52for example,
14:54tyres split in those kind of environments.
14:56The sand blown up
14:58by the constant movement of vehicles
15:00meant that the air filters of engines
15:03took much greater wear
15:04and the amount of lubricants
15:06needed to keep engines running properly
15:08and the amount of maintenance
15:09was vastly increased.
15:12Initially, the panzer tanks
15:14had arrived with normal European air filters
15:17fitted to the engines.
15:19Inevitably,
15:20the sand penetrated through these filters
15:22and the cylinder walls of the engines
15:25would be scoured to a standstill
15:27within 800 or 1,000 miles.
15:34Together,
15:35the German and Italian forces
15:37in North Africa
15:38needed at least 70,000 tonnes of supplies
15:41every month.
15:43All of it had to come by sea
15:45from ports in southern Italy
15:47and all of it came under attack
15:49by the Royal Navy
15:50and the Royal Air Force.
15:53Minor amounts of supplies
15:55were flown in from time to time
15:57but the unarmed Junkers 52 transport aircraft
16:00were rarely available in sufficient numbers
16:03and in any case,
16:04it presented itself as a sitting duck
16:07for any marauding hurricanes.
16:11Although the logistical difficulties
16:14faced by the Africa Corps were enormous,
16:17there's no question that
16:18they were short of supplies,
16:20they were never adequately provided for.
16:24It's interesting if you look at the statistics
16:26of the amount of equipment
16:28which was shipped from Italy
16:29and which actually arrived,
16:31which would appear to suggest
16:33that well over 90% of the men
16:35and the vehicles
16:36and the supplies that were dispatched
16:38actually reached the Africa Corps.
16:40There is an argument, of course,
16:42to say that many of the supplies
16:45that should have been dispatched
16:46were never dispatched in the first place,
16:48which you can accept,
16:49but clearly there was
16:51a regular channel of supply
16:53and it wasn't quite as bleak a picture
16:55as is often painted.
16:58Rommel was eager to advance
17:00as far and as quickly as possible.
17:02He had his eyes focused on the Suez Canal,
17:06his final objective.
17:09Frequently, his supply lines
17:11were stretched to breaking point,
17:13but he was indifferent to the limitations
17:15imposed by his supply situation.
17:18Despite the fact that it was over 800 miles
17:21from his main supply port in Tripoli
17:23to the Egyptian frontier,
17:25Rommel viewed the question of supply
17:27as a matter for the high command to solve.
17:30He perceived it as his job
17:32to fight the war on the ground.
17:36Supplying the army was, in his own words,
17:39not his problem.
17:51The main issue about Rommel's clashes
17:53with his higher command
17:55is that he saw things as theatre operations
17:57and the higher command saw them
17:59as part of a much broader strategy
18:01and Rommel simply could not agree
18:03with their view.
18:05With the growth of this myth
18:07as Rommel,
18:08the kind of superhero
18:10and white knight of the desert,
18:13it's become almost automatic
18:15that people should take
18:16Rommel's position
18:18rather than his superiors.
18:20In particular, officers like Halder
18:22were very good staff officers
18:24who were wrestling
18:25with this enormous tiger by the tail
18:29that they'd caught in Russia.
18:31They needed all the resources
18:32they could possibly lay their hands on.
18:35In the second half of 1942,
18:37they were on the downward path
18:39towards the disaster at Stalingrad.
18:42So you can appreciate
18:43that to have someone in the desert
18:45who was really there
18:46with the brief to pin down
18:48as many Allied forces as he could.
18:51It was unwelcome to have Rommel
18:53coming up with these fanciful schemes
18:57to capture Cairo
18:59and ultimately to look at linking up
19:01with army groups south
19:03in the Caucasus.
19:05When the troops disembarked in Tripoli,
19:07they had little idea
19:08of the conditions they would face.
19:10In Europe,
19:11the staple soldiers' diet
19:13was bread and potatoes.
19:14In the desert,
19:15it was obvious
19:16that these would quickly go mouldy,
19:18so they were supplanted
19:19by biscuits and beans,
19:21occasionally enlivened
19:22by small amounts of cheese,
19:23dehydrated vegetables,
19:25and tins of Italian meat,
19:27the ancestry of which
19:28was always the cause
19:29of much debate
19:30amongst the soldiers.
19:32The men of the Africa Corps
19:34existed on a monotonous diet,
19:36low in vitamin C.
19:38By contrast,
19:40the Allied forces
19:40almost luxuriated
19:41in tinned fruit,
19:42tinned vegetables,
19:44white bread,
19:44and the inevitable bully beef.
19:48The dream of every Africa Corps soldier
19:51was to capture Allied supplies.
19:54These pictures,
19:55taken for the German wartime propaganda magazine,
19:58Signal,
19:59illustrate perfectly the lengths
20:01the men of the Africa Corps
20:02were prepared to go to
20:03to obtain British rations
20:05for a stricken supply ship.
20:08Water,
20:09and the lack of it,
20:10was always a problem,
20:11and it was not unknown
20:13for supply lorries
20:14to make journeys
20:14of 500 kilometres
20:16to collect supplies
20:17of precious water.
20:20The harsh brilliance
20:22of the desert sun
20:23imposed its own rules
20:25on the conduct
20:25of the North African campaign,
20:27with the men suffering
20:28an almost daily form
20:30of desert blindness.
20:32It was soon established
20:33that between dawn
20:34and 9 a.m.,
20:36and again between 4 p.m.
20:37and dusk,
20:38a man could accurately identify
20:40friend or enemy vehicle
20:42at anything between
20:432,000 and 5,000 yards.
20:46In the shimmering,
20:47mirage,
20:48heat of full sun,
20:49that accurate range
20:51dropped to 1,500 yards.
20:54With nightfall,
20:56there usually came an end
20:57to the day's armoured fighting,
20:58but not necessarily
21:00to armoured movement.
21:02Panzer crews were taught
21:04to read a compass,
21:05enabling them to travel
21:06under the cloak of darkness
21:07and during the blinding fury
21:09of a sandstorm.
21:11German recovery crews
21:13were also quick
21:14to seize the advantage
21:15after dark,
21:16to recover their damaged tanks
21:18and send them back
21:20for repair.
21:21They would also seize
21:22the chance to blow up
21:24or commandeer
21:25any Allied tanks
21:26which had been left abandoned
21:28on the battlefield.
21:31The drastic problems
21:32of resupply
21:33for the Africa Corps
21:34made the repair
21:36of damaged tanks
21:37an overriding necessity
21:38if they were to offset
21:40their numerical disadvantage
21:41against the better-supplied
21:43Allied forces.
21:44Rommel was very much
21:46a hands-on commander
21:47who always wanted to know
21:49what was happening
21:50at the sharp end.
21:51He believed
21:52that he had to have
21:54what he called
21:55a fingertip feel
21:56for the battlefield
21:57so that he could
21:59be there in person
22:01during the crisis
22:02of a battle.
22:04This meant that Rommel
22:05was often able to react
22:07much faster to events
22:09than his British counterparts
22:10who did rely
22:11upon the chain of command.
22:13But at the same time
22:15it also meant that
22:16Rommel left
22:17his chief of staff
22:18and his main headquarters
22:19often miles behind
22:21as he toured the battlefield
22:22in his personal half-track.
22:24He did have
22:25a fairly good
22:27radio communication system
22:28but this was often
22:29being jammed
22:30by the British.
22:31This was
22:33just the nature of things
22:35radio communications
22:36were at times
22:37problematical
22:37and his commanders
22:40or subordinate commanders
22:41simply didn't know
22:42where their corps commander
22:44and later on
22:44their army commander
22:45actually was.
22:48In the featureless desert
22:50the art of concealment
22:52camouflage
22:52was another skill
22:54quickly learned
22:55by the men
22:55of the Afrika Korps.
22:57When the first
22:58panzer mark 2,
22:593s and 4s arrived
23:00they were painted
23:02in the Wehrmacht colors
23:03of grey-green
23:04far too highly visible
23:06in the desert.
23:08In the absence
23:09of desert colour paint
23:10these first tanks
23:12were sprayed with oil
23:13and then hot sand
23:15was thrown over them
23:16until they more or less
23:17blended in
23:18with the background.
23:19The crews
23:20quickly learned
23:21to make skilful use
23:22of netting
23:23and the camel-thorn bush
23:25to break up
23:25the outline
23:26of their tanks.
23:28The field gunners
23:30became expert
23:31at digging in
23:32their weapons.
23:32If they couldn't
23:34dig them into the sand
23:35they would blast
23:36the rocky ground
23:37aside to make
23:38a gun pit.
23:40With the barrels
23:41pointing horizontally
23:42there was
23:42as Rommel himself
23:44put it
23:44scarcely anything
23:46to be seen.
23:48For the inventory
23:49camouflage netting
23:51served a dual purpose.
23:52In their slit trenches
23:54netting hid them
23:55from view
23:55and also supplied
23:57a degree of protection
23:58from the heat
23:58of the sun.
24:00Often the men
24:01of the Afrika Korps
24:02had little time
24:03to dig a slit trench
24:04for Rommel's tactics
24:05sought to combine
24:06the infantry
24:07with the guns
24:07and tanks
24:08so that all arms
24:09of the Afrika Korps
24:10fought as an
24:12integrated whole
24:13bringing the maximum
24:14effort to bear
24:15in a concentrated thrust.
24:19Despite the fact
24:20that he personally
24:21had to cross
24:22large areas
24:23of featureless terrain
24:24the restless energy
24:26of Rommel
24:26drove his men forward.
24:29When he was not
24:30at the helm
24:30of his command car
24:31Graef
24:32Rommel was to be found
24:33reconnointering the ground
24:34from the cockpit
24:35of his Faisler
24:35Stork reconnaissance aircraft
24:37from which
24:38he was constantly
24:39urging his troops forward.
24:42Encouraged
24:43and exhorted
24:44by the gadfly energy
24:45of their commanding officer
24:46the tank crew
24:48surged forward.
24:50The armoured brow
24:51of the division
24:52was formed
24:53by the tank battalion
24:54with artillery support
24:56consisting mainly
24:56of the lethal 88mm
24:58anti-aircraft gun
24:59now expertly employed
25:01as an anti-tank weapon
25:03and towed into action
25:04either by wheeled lorries
25:06or half-tracks.
25:09Mounted on these towed trailers
25:11the 88mm gun
25:13could be swiftly deployed
25:14and engage the enemy
25:15at 2,000 yard range
25:17long before the allied tank guns
25:20were close enough to reply.
25:22The 88mm
25:24had one more advantage
25:26besides the armour-piercing range
25:28it also fired
25:29high-explosive shells.
25:33The Panzer Mark III and IV
25:35could also fire
25:37high-explosive shells
25:38which were devastating
25:39against infantry
25:40but had little effect
25:41against the British tanks
25:42such as the Valentine
25:44and the Crusader.
25:47Behind Rommel's early successes
25:49in his advance eastwards
25:50was his firm belief
25:52that he could crush
25:53the allied forces
25:54and continue his advance
25:56all the way to Alexandria
25:58and the Suez Canal.
26:01From there
26:02he could set his sights
26:03on the rich oil fields
26:05of the Caucasus
26:05in the southern Soviet Union
26:07and then achieve
26:09a classic pincer movement
26:10striking a decisive blow
26:12in Germany's war
26:14against the Russians.
26:17The idea of Rommel
26:19linking up
26:20with Army Group South
26:21in its drive
26:22through the Caucasus
26:23and Rommel's drive
26:25to Egypt
26:26and on
26:27to Palestine
26:28in 1942
26:29has to be described
26:31as a mere flight
26:32of fancy.
26:33In many respects
26:35it actually shows
26:36the very unrealistic
26:38nature
26:38of German strategic planning
26:40during the Second World War
26:42which never really got down
26:43to hard tacks
26:45to the firm
26:45grasp of realities
26:47which was highlighted
26:49by the British
26:50and American approach.
26:52Logistic problems
26:53that Rommel faced
26:53were immense
26:54even if he had
26:55taken Cairo
26:56even if he had
26:57got into the Delta
26:58he would still have
26:59had to fight his way
26:59over the Suez Canal.
27:01He would then have
27:02had to fight his way
27:03through the Mittler Pass
27:04and the Gidae Pass
27:05through the Sinai.
27:06He would have faced
27:07very much the same problems
27:08that the British faced
27:09in 1916 and 1917
27:10in fighting his way
27:12through the Sinai.
27:14There wasn't
27:14the slightest possibility
27:16of this great strategic link-up
27:18ever taking place.
27:20What is interesting
27:21is that the Allies
27:22genuinely believed
27:23it was a possibility.
27:27Hitler had made
27:28a good choice in Rommel
27:29although he had
27:31a number of
27:31idiosyncratic traits.
27:34The German High Command
27:35made it clear
27:36he was to operate
27:37first a blocking operation
27:39and then a counter-offensive
27:41to retake Cyrenaica
27:42but always
27:44under the overall command
27:46of the Italian
27:47Supreme Command.
27:49Rommel's relations
27:49with the Italians
27:50were generally poor.
27:52I think he despised them.
27:54When he first went out
27:55there the Italian general
27:56Italo Garibaldi
27:58was supposed to be
27:59his commander
28:00and essentially
28:01Rommel disregarded
28:02most of his instructions
28:04but then you mustn't forget
28:05that he actually disregarded
28:06the instructions
28:07of his superior
28:07German officers
28:09as well.
28:10Rommel
28:10had a great deal
28:12of scepticism
28:13about the Italian
28:14High Command
28:14in particular
28:15and indeed
28:16the quality
28:17of the Italian officers.
28:19He ignores
28:20his Italian
28:21Supreme Commander.
28:23He occasionally
28:25will inform him
28:26what he's doing
28:26but quite often
28:27he won't.
28:28He will just go off
28:29and do it
28:30all by himself.
28:31The only Italians
28:32Rommel ever took seriously
28:34were the people
28:34who were running
28:35the ports
28:35of Naples
28:37and other ports
28:38up the Italian coast
28:39because these people
28:40were very, very important
28:41to him
28:41in bringing in supplies.
28:43What Hitler
28:44had not anticipated
28:45was that Rommel's success
28:47in bolstering
28:48the Italian forces
28:49would rapidly lead
28:51to his series
28:51of offensive successes.
28:54Hitler
28:55had originally
28:56wanted the Afrika Korps
28:57to be no more
28:58than a dam,
28:59a buttress
29:00of the Axis Pact
29:01but Rommel
29:03turned it into
29:04an aggressive flood
29:05acquiring laws
29:06of its own.
29:09In spite of Rommel's
29:11impressive victories
29:12there was always
29:13an uneasy relationship
29:14between himself
29:15and the officers
29:16of the German
29:17High Command
29:18perhaps amplified
29:20by the fact
29:21he was merely
29:21a Swabian
29:22not an aristocratic
29:24member of the
29:25Prussian officer class
29:26and had never
29:27been a member
29:28of Hitler's
29:29general staff.
29:31Rommel could be
29:32abrasive
29:33surly, mercurial
29:34and dogmatic
29:35but he was also
29:37a brilliant commander
29:38in the field.
29:39Rommel
29:40master of the fluid
29:41ebb and flow
29:42of a battle
29:42was quick
29:43to seize the initiative
29:44quick to exploit
29:46the weaknesses
29:47of his enemy.
29:48He stuck to the
29:49well-tried principles
29:50of the lightly
29:51armed thrust
29:52designed to sow
29:53confusion
29:54within the enemy ranks.
29:56There's no doubt
29:57that Rommel
29:58had flaws
29:59as a commander.
30:00He was rash
30:01he was overambitious
30:03he was overoptimistic
30:05in situations
30:06which didn't
30:07really allow
30:08for that.
30:09He was egocentric
30:10without a doubt
30:11he was very much
30:12a creator
30:13of his own image
30:14and I think
30:15in the end
30:16he actually drove
30:17his men
30:18and his material
30:19the equipment
30:19that he used
30:20probably too hard
30:21to achieve the ends
30:23and this left him
30:24vulnerable
30:25on several occasions
30:26to counterattack.
30:27Rommel never understood
30:28the relationship
30:30between logistics
30:31and his fighting
30:33at the front
30:34and would constantly
30:35blame his quartermasters
30:37for not providing
30:38the materials he needed
30:39to win his battles
30:41without realising
30:42of course
30:43that by stretching
30:44the front
30:44ever further
30:45it made the quartermasters
30:47job yet more difficult.
30:49During his first
30:50rapid onslaught
30:51against the Allies
30:52Rommel achieved
30:53the capture
30:54of Benghazi
30:54and the bulge
30:56of Cyrenaica
30:56his forces
30:58also surrounded
30:59the British supply base
31:00at Tobruk
31:01and reached as far east
31:02as Solon.
31:05General Rommel
31:05was here
31:06there
31:06everywhere
31:07as his armoured columns
31:08burst across the desert
31:10everywhere
31:11except
31:12in his headquarters.
31:14He kept in touch
31:15by radio
31:16but when communications
31:17dried up
31:18the cohesion
31:19of the army
31:19was at stake.
31:22After his success
31:23against the British
31:24counter-offensive
31:25Operation Battle Axe
31:27Rommel wrote
31:28to his wife
31:29Lucy
31:31I have been
31:32three days
31:33on the road
31:33going round
31:34the battlefield
31:35the joy
31:36of my troops
31:37is tremendous.
31:39One of his staff
31:40officers remarked
31:41he is already
31:42in the process
31:43of becoming a hero
31:45and he was
31:46a hero
31:47and a legend
31:48worshipped
31:49by his men
31:49held in awe
31:51by his enemies.
31:53The growth
31:54of the Rommel
31:55legend
31:55can be
31:56ascribed
31:57at least in part
31:58to Winston Churchill
31:59who actually
32:00referred to Rommel
32:01by name
32:02in the House
32:03of Commons.
32:04Rommel
32:05had become
32:06quite a sensation
32:07in 1941
32:08and British troops
32:10did consider
32:11Rommel
32:11to be the
32:12Desert Fox
32:13almost a magician
32:14of war
32:15who would always
32:16beat them.
32:16it took
32:17General Montgomery
32:19who had
32:19a similar
32:20cult of personality
32:21to actually
32:22provide a different
32:23focus for the
32:24British troops
32:25in the Desert.
32:26One of the very
32:26first things he did
32:27was issue a
32:28general order
32:29stating that
32:29the name Rommel
32:30was not to be used
32:31in official communiques
32:33whatsoever.
32:35You could refer
32:35to the Axis forces
32:36and you could
32:37refer to
32:38the enemy
32:39but the name
32:39Rommel
32:40was not to be used.
32:42Now it's typical
32:43that Montgomery
32:43would be the man
32:44to do that
32:44because Montgomery
32:45was intent
32:45on creating
32:46his own legend
32:47which he did
32:48very successfully
32:49indeed.
32:50When he finally
32:51captured Tobruk
32:52General Rommel
32:54was promoted
32:54to the rank
32:55of Field Marshal
32:56the highest rank
32:57in the army.
32:58He was just
32:5949.
33:01By August
33:021942
33:03even Rommel
33:05was beginning
33:05to show signs
33:06of the strain
33:07caused by
33:0818 months
33:09continuous action
33:10continuous fighting.
33:13His iron will
33:14alone
33:15could no longer
33:16drive his body.
33:17He was suffering
33:18acute gastric pains
33:20and was experiencing
33:21fainting fits
33:22and he was about
33:24to face
33:24his biggest challenge
33:25the reinvigorated
33:27British 8th Army
33:28under Montgomery
33:29at El Alamein.
33:32In September
33:33he flew back
33:34to Germany
33:35for treatment.
33:36A few weeks later
33:37Montgomery's attack
33:38began
33:39and Hitler
33:40cabled Rommel
33:41requesting his return
33:42forthwith
33:43to North Africa.
33:46Rommel did return
33:47but with a deep
33:48sense of foreboding
33:50disillusioned
33:51with Hitler
33:51and the Führer's
33:52disposable attitude
33:53to the brave men
33:55of the Afrika Korps.
34:01The world
34:02was a different place
34:03when Rommel
34:04with his then
34:05unknown Afrika Korps
34:06had been ordered
34:07to take up
34:08the stance
34:08of aggressive defence
34:09and he knew
34:11he must seize
34:12the initiative
34:13from the enemy.
34:14He must turn
34:15a retreat
34:15into an advance.
34:17He must make ground
34:18and he must demonstrate
34:19to the British
34:20that from now on
34:21they would be fighting
34:22the Afrika Korps,
34:23a very different opponent
34:25from the Italians.
34:28Advance was the order
34:30of the day.
34:31Having landed
34:33in Tripoli
34:35in February,
34:36they were then
34:36confronted
34:37with overextended
34:38British forces
34:39and were able
34:40to drive them back
34:41first to El Agila
34:42and then to
34:44Bardia and Solum
34:46in eastern Libya
34:48relatively quickly,
34:50essentially through
34:50a series of
34:51right-flanking movements
34:53inland from the coast
34:55which kept on
34:56cutting off
34:56and isolating
34:57the British
34:58Eighth Army troops.
34:59By May 1941,
35:02Rommel's force
35:03stood on the
35:03frontiers of Egypt
35:04with only the
35:06fortress of Tobruk
35:07behind him
35:09acting as a thorn
35:10in his side.
35:11This was an
35:12astonishing success
35:13which the British
35:14simply hadn't
35:15calculated on
35:16and in their
35:18subsequent attempts
35:20to dislodge
35:21Rommel
35:21from the frontier
35:22and relieve Tobruk
35:23in operations
35:24Brevity and
35:25Battle Axe,
35:25Rommel's men
35:26were able
35:27to easily
35:28brush aside
35:29these British
35:29offensives.
35:30Rommel was forced
35:31to give up
35:32all that he had
35:32gained in 1941
35:34because Eighth Army
35:35opposition stiffened up.
35:37In May 1941
35:38there was
35:38Operation Brevity
35:39and then in June
35:41there was
35:42Operation Crusader,
35:43neither of which
35:44were dramatically
35:44successful
35:45from the British
35:47and Allied
35:47point of view
35:48but it did at least
35:49inflict casualties
35:50on Rommel.
35:51It wasn't in fact
35:53until Operation
35:55Battle Axe
35:56in November
35:571941
35:58that a reorganised
36:00Eighth Army
36:01was able to
36:01drive Rommel back
36:03and by this time
36:04the Eighth Army
36:05had considerably
36:06increased its
36:07number of men
36:08and armour
36:09and Rommel
36:10was at an
36:11overextended
36:12logistic support line.
36:14The force ratios
36:15were substantially
36:17against Rommel
36:18by November
36:191941.
36:20The first aerial
36:21reconnaissance report
36:22which came back
36:23of the British
36:23advance,
36:24they simply
36:24couldn't believe
36:25the size of the
36:26British forces
36:26which were actually
36:27advancing against them.
36:28One of the
36:29Me 109
36:29reconnaissance aircraft
36:31actually flew
36:32a long column
36:33and the pilot
36:35started a stopwatch
36:36when he actually
36:36reached the beginning
36:37of the column
36:38and he stopped
36:38the stopwatch
36:39when he reached
36:39the end of it
36:40and he had it
36:40running for ten
36:41minutes
36:42and he was actually
36:43flying at over
36:44300 miles an hour
36:45and this was
36:46the information
36:46which was coming
36:47back to Rommel
36:47that the British
36:48are coming at us
36:49with immense forces
36:51and indeed
36:51the British
36:52outnumbered
36:53the Germans
36:54and Italians
36:54by this time
36:55by a factor
36:55of more than
36:56two is to one.
36:57Indeed if it's
36:57German forces
36:58then the ratio
36:59is substantially
37:00much more than that.
37:02What is remarkable
37:02about the campaign
37:04of November
37:04into December
37:05of 1941
37:06is how very close
37:07Rommel actually
37:07came to stopping
37:08the British advance
37:09dead in its tracks.
37:11It is one of the
37:11most brilliant
37:12manoeuvre campaigns
37:13of all time.
37:14Rommel was defeated
37:16in the end
37:17he was forced
37:17to retreat
37:18but he withdrew
37:19his forces intact.
37:21He was simply
37:22outnumbered.
37:27He was fighting
37:29on what was it
37:30essentially two fronts.
37:32He had the
37:32Dubroque garrison
37:33to the rear
37:34and he had to
37:35maintain substantial
37:36forces to actually
37:37invest Dubroque.
37:38At the same time
37:39he was trying
37:40to hold back
37:40very very substantial
37:41British forces
37:42along the Egyptian
37:43frontier.
37:44Now he'd been able
37:44to do this
37:45successively twice
37:46for the
37:46Helfire Pass battles
37:48in May of 1941
37:50and then again
37:51in the high summer
37:52Operation Battleaxe.
37:54Rommel was forced
37:56to retreat
37:56in December 1941
37:59after some of
38:00the most punishing
38:01and bloody battles
38:02of the Desert War.
38:04The British
38:05launched Operation
38:06Crusader
38:07to relieve Dubroque
38:09on the 5th of November
38:101941
38:11and indeed caught
38:13Rommel and his
38:14Afrika Korps
38:15by surprise.
38:16Through a series
38:17of incredibly
38:18confused
38:19and bloody battles
38:21particularly around
38:22Sidi Rezegh
38:23during November
38:24the strength
38:26of both participants
38:27the 8th Army
38:28and the Afrika Korps
38:30was slowly worn down.
38:33However by early
38:34December 1941
38:35it was quite clear
38:37to Rommel
38:37after his abortive
38:39dash to the wire
38:40in an attempt
38:41to frighten
38:41the 8th Army
38:42into retreat
38:44and with
38:44Auchinleck
38:45taking direct
38:46control of the
38:478th Army
38:47and Auchinleck
38:49was not a man
38:49to be frightened
38:51into retreat
38:51by a mere phantom.
38:54Rommel realised
38:55that the strength
38:55of the Afrika Korps
38:56could not hold out
38:57for much longer.
38:59Given this position
39:00he decided
39:01to retreat
39:01back to his
39:02start line
39:03of April 1941
39:05to rebuild
39:06his forces
39:07and to launch
39:09another campaign
39:10in 1942.
39:13Operation Crusader
39:14then has often
39:15not received
39:16the critical acclaim
39:18that it might
39:18otherwise have done.
39:20It was a British
39:21victory
39:21although very hard won
39:23but it certainly
39:24showed that
39:25the 8th Army
39:26and its commander
39:27General Auchinleck
39:28could stand up
39:30to Rommel
39:30and his Afrika Korps.
39:34On December 7th
39:351941
39:36with just 40 tanks
39:38left in fighting order
39:39Rommel decided
39:40to make a tactical
39:41withdrawal.
39:43He and his men
39:44would live
39:45to fight another day.
39:46The Axis forces
39:48fell back
39:49past Tobruk
39:50losing Benghazi
39:51to new prepared lines
39:53from Mirada
39:53to Marse Elbrega.
39:56Despite being
39:57desperately short
39:58of supplies
39:59Rommel began
40:00his counteroffensive.
40:01The Afrika Korps
40:02attacked once more.
40:05Eventually
40:06the Allied 8th Army
40:07was forced to withdraw
40:08eastwards
40:09to the Egyptian frontier.
40:12Rommel
40:13maintained a hectic
40:14pursuit of the British
40:15forces as they fell back
40:17to prepared positions
40:18at El Alamein.
40:20The two battles
40:21for El Alamein
40:22would decide the destiny
40:24of the North African
40:25campaign.
40:28As the victorious
40:29Afrika Korps
40:30and Rommel
40:31surged eastwards
40:32he turned briefly north
40:34and in 40 hours
40:35of fighting
40:36against a garrison force
40:37which had held out
40:38for eight months
40:39he finally captured
40:41Tobruk.
40:4333,000 prisoners
40:45were taken
40:46as well as
40:47a mountain
40:47of supplies.
40:48The 21st of June
40:501942
40:50when Rommel
40:52captured Tobruk
40:53this port and fortress
40:55which had been a thorn
40:56in his side
40:56throughout 1941
40:57really was
40:58the high point
41:00of Rommel's
41:01career.
41:02From there
41:03Rommel was able
41:04to press
41:05further west
41:06to El Alamein
41:07and it looked
41:08for a moment
41:09as if he was going
41:10to break
41:11through there
41:11but
41:13Orkin elect
41:14fought a battle
41:15at El Alamein
41:15which held
41:16Rommel
41:17and a few months
41:18later
41:19the new commander
41:19of the 8th army
41:20Montgomery
41:22launched an attack
41:23in late October
41:24but only after
41:26he had built up
41:27a 3 to 1 superiority
41:28in almost everything
41:29tanks, guns,
41:30aircraft and men
41:31really forcing
41:34Rommel
41:34to fight
41:34a battle
41:35of attrition.
41:36Altered short
41:37of El Alamein
41:38Rommel
41:38demanded
41:39his desperately
41:40needed supplies
41:41of petrol
41:41and tanks.
41:43He suspected
41:44a breakout
41:44of the 8th army
41:45and lost no time
41:46in preparing
41:47defensive positions
41:48to repel
41:49such an event.
41:51Some petrol
41:52and some tanks
41:53did arrive
41:54but nowhere near
41:55enough to match
41:56the massive buildup
41:57of Allied troops,
41:58tanks, guns
41:59and supplies
42:00which was being fed
42:01to the 8th army
42:02now under the leadership
42:04of the cautious
42:04General Montgomery.
42:06Cautious
42:07because Montgomery
42:08had no intention
42:09of being brushed
42:10into an ill-prepared
42:10breakout.
42:12He would attack
42:13when all his elements
42:14were in place
42:15and not before.
42:18It was October
42:191942
42:20when Monty
42:21was finally ready
42:22and he began
42:24his attack.
42:26Strengthened
42:26with a colossal
42:27superiority of numbers
42:29an attack
42:30which would mark
42:31the beginning
42:31of the end
42:32for the Africa Corps.
42:35Under the steady
42:36onslaught
42:37of the British 8th Army
42:38the Panzer Army
42:39was forced to retreat
42:41further and further westwards.
42:43From October 1942
42:44to February 1943
42:46the Africa Corps
42:48was pushed back
42:49from El Alamein
42:50out of Libya
42:51and into Tunisia.
42:54In Tunisia
42:55Rommel learned
42:57of the Allied plan
42:58Operation Torch
42:59which threatened
43:00his rear guard.
43:03Urgent reinforcements
43:04including the
43:05Hermann Göring
43:05parachute division
43:06and the first Tiger
43:08tanks to be sent
43:09to Africa
43:09were flown in
43:10from Germany.
43:12Acting in conjunction
43:13with these troops
43:14Rommel risked
43:15his faithful
43:1621st Panzer Division
43:17falling upon
43:19the unsuspecting
43:20American forces
43:20here at the
43:21Kasserin Pass
43:22in a battle
43:24in a battle
43:24which began
43:24on February
43:25the 14th 1943.
43:28The initial success
43:30of the attack
43:31proved to be
43:32Rommel's last success
43:33in Africa.
43:35He achieved surprise
43:36that it was a brilliantly
43:38executed initial operation
43:40but one of Rommel's
43:42great flaws
43:42as a general
43:43was to attempt
43:44to follow up
43:46on an initial success
43:47beyond the limits
43:50of his resources
43:51and that's certainly
43:51what happened
43:52at Kasserin.
43:53He rebuffed
43:54the American
43:55First Army
43:56and inflicted
43:58severe damage
43:59on one of its
44:00armoured divisions
44:01but a counter-attack
44:03by experienced
44:04British troops
44:05meant that he wasn't
44:06really able to
44:07exploit the opportunities
44:08that might have been
44:10achieved against
44:10the raw Americans.
44:13The American defeat
44:14at the Kasserin Pass
44:15had immense ramifications
44:17on the structure
44:18of the American forces.
44:20They'd gone to the war
44:22believing that
44:23they had all sorts
44:24of answers
44:25for dealing with
44:26German armour,
44:27German armour tactics
44:28and so on.
44:29They suddenly found
44:30that they were back
44:30at square one.
44:32It was here
44:33at Medellin
44:34that Rommel
44:35fought his last battle
44:36in Africa.
44:38Despite the tremendous
44:39strength of these positions
44:40prepared by the French
44:42to resist any Italian
44:43offensive on their territory,
44:45Rommel's Africa Corps
44:47had lost its own mobility
44:49and, crucially,
44:50all support from the air.
44:53Despite staunch resistance,
44:55they were easily outflanked
44:57by the Allied forces.
44:59At the Medellin battle,
45:01Rommel, in hoping for success,
45:04had to achieve surprise
45:05but Montgomery had completed
45:07his preparations
45:08and was well able
45:09to receive the attack
45:10of both the German
45:12and Italian forces.
45:14in this way,
45:15the attack was brushed aside,
45:17in fact,
45:18without the loss
45:18of a single British tank.
45:20In part,
45:21he was outgeneraled
45:22by Montgomery
45:23who encouraged
45:24an attack
45:25on a well-defended position
45:28with anti-tank guns
45:29which actually wiped out
45:3050 of the German tanks.
45:33So he was actually
45:34outmaneuvered.
45:35And then later in March,
45:37when he was called
45:37back to Germany
45:38and entertained
45:39on sick leave,
45:41his successor,
45:41Rommel's successor,
45:42was killed
45:43in an artillery barrage
45:45and the final successor,
45:46von Arnim,
45:48was outnumbered
45:49in infantry
45:50by at least two to one
45:51and in tanks
45:52he was facing
45:531,200 Allied tanks
45:55with barely 100
45:56of his own.
45:58So there was
45:58very little chance.
45:59The failure at Medellin
46:01signaled the end
46:03of the Italian Empire
46:04in North Africa.
46:05But Rommel
46:06would at least
46:07save the remnants
46:07of his army
46:08with the faint possibility
46:10of rebuilding
46:11some sort of bridgehead.
46:13In March 1943
46:15at Medellin
46:16came the last
46:17major German attack
46:18in North Africa
46:19against the overwhelming
46:20strength of the 8th Army.
46:23It failed the same day.
46:25Within two months
46:26the entire Axis forces
46:28would capitulate.
46:30150,000 German soldiers
46:32marched with their heads
46:33held high
46:34into captivity.
46:36Under Rommel
46:37the first unit
46:38to be formed
46:39with the sole intention
46:40of bolstering
46:40the wavering Italian morale
46:42was the 5th Light Division
46:44later renamed
46:45the 21st Panzer Division.
46:47In time
46:48they were further
46:49reinforced
46:50by the 15th Panzer Division
46:52and the 90th Light Division.
46:56The German force
46:57in North Africa
46:58has now passed
46:59into history
47:00as the Afrika Korp
47:01although it was
47:02known by that name
47:03for a comparatively
47:04short time.
47:06As it grew in size
47:08the Afrika Korp
47:10was re-designated
47:11as Panzer Group Africa
47:13by which time
47:14it incorporated
47:15six Italian divisions.
47:18In 1942
47:20Rommel's troops
47:21changed their title again
47:23from Panzer Group Africa
47:24to Panzer Army Africa
47:26by which time
47:27it incorporated
47:28the original divisions
47:30of the Afrika Korp
47:31plus two more
47:32German infantry divisions
47:33one German parachute brigade
47:35and eight Italian divisions.
47:39As the men
47:40of the Afrika Korp
47:41fought their way
47:42across the bleached
47:43wilderness of the desert
47:44Rommel was all the while
47:46struggling not only
47:47with the British forces
47:48but also with his masters
47:50in Germany.
47:53Hitler's interest
47:55in the North African campaign
47:56ranged from
47:57cool indifference
47:58through mounting indecision
48:00to frenzied demands
48:02towards the end
48:03of the desert war
48:04to fight
48:05to the bitter end.
48:07He was also
48:08responsible
48:09for another thorn
48:10in the side
48:11of the Afrika Korp
48:11because the Korp
48:13at Mussolini's
48:14insistence
48:14came under the command
48:16of the Italian
48:17commander-in-chief
48:18and while always
48:20perfectly correct
48:21Rommel had little time
48:22for the fighting ability
48:24of his Italian comrades.
48:31Although Rommel
48:32was nominally
48:33under the command
48:35of the Italians
48:35he was of course
48:36very disparaging
48:37by and large
48:39about his Italian
48:41superiors
48:42General Bussacco
48:43for instance
48:44Rommel
48:45was quite happily
48:46for him to be
48:46known as General
48:48Bombastico
48:49although he paid
48:51lip service
48:51to the idea
48:52of being
48:53subordinate
48:54to the Italians
48:55in practice
48:56it was Rommel
48:56who ran the show.
48:58The last grouping
48:59of the Axis forces
49:00occurred in February
49:011943
49:02when it became
49:03known as
49:04Army Group Africa
49:05two years
49:06after the original
49:07Afrika Korp
49:08had been formed
49:09and with Field Marshal
49:10Rommel
49:11at its head.
49:13The formation
49:14of the Afrika Korp
49:15had drawn many men
49:16from many different areas.
49:18For instance
49:19many of the men
49:20of the 90th Light Division
49:21had previously served
49:23in the French Foreign Legion.
49:25In its flowering
49:26the Afrika Korp
49:27even boasted
49:28a special unit
49:29of crack troops
49:30along the lines
49:31of the British
49:32Long Range Desert Group.
49:34This was the
49:35Sondaba Band
49:36288
49:37Special Unit
49:38288
49:39formed
49:40to operate deep
49:41behind the British lines
49:42carrying out attacks
49:44against the oil fields.
49:46They too
49:47wore the cuff band
49:48of the Afrika Korp
49:49and while they served
49:50like their comrades
49:51under a number
49:52of commanding officers
49:53it was the name
49:54of Rommel
49:55which indelibly
49:56linked them
49:57to the Afrika Korp.
49:59Rommel
50:00now a disillusioned
50:02and physically sick man
50:03was ordered
50:04to leave
50:04his beloved Afrika Korp
50:06on March 9th
50:071943.
50:09He flew back
50:10to Europe
50:11deep in despair
50:12about the approach
50:13of the inevitable end.
50:15Hitler
50:16this time
50:17refused to allow him
50:18to return to Africa
50:19where his men
50:20now under the command
50:21of General von Armin
50:22soldiered on.
50:25The Axis forces
50:26retreated all the way
50:27into Tunisia
50:28and to Enfidaville
50:29some 25 miles south
50:31of the Cape Bon Peninsula
50:33and between the mountains
50:34and the sea.
50:36Here
50:37the 90th Light Division
50:39dug in around the hills
50:40while the 21st Panzer Division
50:42prepared to meet
50:43a head-on thrust
50:44from the massed
50:45Allied forces.
50:48During the first days of May
50:50an incredibly ferocious
50:52artillery and air bombardment
50:54ripped into the German positions.
50:57At the heart of the defense
50:58of Tunis
50:59the 15th Panzer
51:00made a desperate
51:01last attempt
51:02to survive
51:02the overwhelming
51:03Allied forces.
51:05The guns fired
51:07until there was
51:08no more ammunition.
51:09The tanks
51:10when their petrol was gone
51:11carried on firing
51:13from where they stopped
51:14until they too
51:15ran out of ammunition.
51:18The official report
51:19of Army Group Africa
51:21preserved to this day
51:23records simply
51:24the bulk of 15th Panzer Division
51:27must be deemed
51:28to have been destroyed.
51:31In early May
51:32slowly
51:33reluctantly
51:34the white flags
51:36of surrender
51:36began to appear
51:37from the men
51:38whom Hitler
51:39had ordered to fight
51:40to the last.
51:42The Allies
51:43marched triumphantly
51:44into Tunis.
51:46Rommel's Africa Corps
51:47had existed
51:49for two years
51:50and three months.
51:52Outgunned,
51:53out-supplied,
51:54out-numbered
51:55but rarely
51:56out-manoeuvred
51:57the Africa Corps
51:58marched proudly
51:59into the pages
52:00of German
52:01military history.
52:24The Allies
52:39Transcription by CastingWords
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